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ABSTRACT 
 
Prediction markets (PM) have emerged as a major tool for contemporary decision making tools within 
economic, financial and psychological literature. It is arguably one of the most efficient markets in history. 
Although applicable within financial markets, the principles of PM can also be applied within political 
frameworks, corporate environments public enterprise management. That is why since its discovery; other 
areas of human endeavour have applied prediction markets for organization-wide decision making with 
different outcomes and recommendations for improvement in prediction markets. This review examines the 
history of prediction markets, its ontology, epistemology and paradigm. It also examines the early applications 
of prediction market to institutional decision making and how early challenges have strengthened modern 
prediction markets. The key issues facing prediction market as a decision making tool is revisited in the last 
section before summarizing our findings and future research direction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A relatively new phenomenon within economic, 
financial and psychological literature, Prediction 
Markets (PM) has emerged as “arguably one of the 
most efficient markets in history” (Sporer et al, 
2010). PM are defined as markets that are designed 
and run for the primary purpose of mining and 
aggregating information scattered among traders and 
subsequently using this information in the form of 
market values in order to make predictions about 
specific future events (Berg and Rietz, 2003; Bagust 
et al, 2009). Although applicable within financial 
markets, the principles of PM can also be applied 
within political frameworks and most notably for this 
paper, corporate environments (Strumpf, 2009), an 
aspect that will be later discussed in detail. Indeed, 
further to Berg and Rietz’s definition of PM, Strumpf 
states that PM utilize the knowledge of a pool of 
individuals to help forecast questions of importance 
to companies such as whether a project will be 
completed in a timely manner or whether a sales 
target will be reached (Abdel-Aal and angoud, 2013). 
As both of the above definitions portray, PM have built 
upon many of the conditions discussed by Surowiecki 
and his peers, utilising the diversity of wisdom that is 
available within a given gathered crowd. As will be 
seen, there has been an “exploding growth of 
interest” in PM over the past two decades 
(Tatziopoulos & Tziralis, 2007; Batchelor, et al, 
2015) with many major multinational businesses 
opting to operate their own internal PM. 
 
The First Prediction Markets 
 
PM were first introduced in a series of articles written 
by Robin Hanson (1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1992) yet prior 
to this in 1988 the earliest known application of PM, 
the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM), were initiated. 
These markets were aimed at studying market 
dynamics whilst acting as a predictive mechanism for 
the outcome of elections (Israel & Silber, 2012; 
Connolly et al, 2010). Within the market various 
contracts can be traded such as simple binary and 
winner-takes-all contracts and slightly more 
complicated contracts that are designed to predict the 
vote share rather than the simple outcome. Since their 
introduction in 1988, the IEM have proved to be 
“highly consistent” returning “remarkable accuracy” 
outperforming traditional, and often more publicly 
appraised political polls over three-quarters of the time 
(Hall, 2010). Additionally, these markets didn’t consist 
of more than 1,500 individual traders over this period 
(Israel & Silber, 2012; Cook et al, 2010) and as 
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Surowiecki reports, the vast majority of these were 
male and despite being an online platform open to all, a 
disproportionate amount of participants were from 
Iowa, thus representing a relatively un-diversified 
sample. 
The IEM requires participants to put their “money 
where their mouth is” (Hanson 1999; Kugler, et al, 
2012) and whilst most economists believe markets 
where traders risk their own money should produce 
better forecasts than markets where traders run no 
financial risk (Galebach et al, 2004;p Diaz-Aviles, et 
al, 2012), as with the wisdom of crowds literature 
there is no concrete evidence to suggest that there is a 
disparity in accuracy when using real- or play-money 
(Galebach et al, 2004). Diemer and Poblete did find in 
their study however, that play-money incentives 
generated more accurate results on a portfolio 
consisting of various events. In direct contract 
comparison, nevertheless, real money was shown to 
be the more effective incentive scheme (2010). A 
further example of a PM is The Hollywood Stock 
Exchange (HSX). The HSX is an internet based play-
money market that allows participants to trade on 
box-office returns and award show results. In 
amongst the markets consistent level of high 
accuracy, in 2000 and 2002 respectively, the HSX 
correctly predicted six out of six Oscar winners and 
35 out of 40 eventual Oscar nominees (Surowiecki, 
2004). As can be seen, the efficiency of the IEM and 
HSX represents the power of such open markets. 
Given this accuracy it is unsurprising that academics 
such as Sunstein (2006) have heavily backed PM as 
the future of predictive methods; indeed the volume 
of research being conducted by academics into PM 
has increased 700% in the period since 1990 – 2006 
(Tatsiopoulos & Tziralis, 2007), if anything, a sign 
that research is proving fruitful. 
 
Corporate Applications of PM 
 
Within corporate firms, PM have been utilised to 
produce outcomes to numerous issues; Numerical 
forecasting, decision making and risk management to 
name a few. Whether used to predict demand for a 
good or service; assist management to decide which 
product to produce; or to develop ideas as to the level 
of exposure within a marketplace, PM can, when used 
in a functional environment asking the correct 
questions, be an extremely effective tool for decision 
makers. This section will review some of the different 
types and successes of markets conducted to date and 
discuss some of the debated issues that threaten on 
occasion to detract from the accuracy of these markets 
when carried out in a corporate setting. 
For many firms conducting business within a 
competitive marketplace, product innovation and being 
the first to bring a specific new product types to the 
market is a crucial component of maintaining a strong 
market presence. Technology firms such as Hewlett 
Packard (HP) are one such firm, experiencing 
difficulties in forecasting demand when lifecycles are 
short and demand variability is high for technical 
products (Chen and Ho, 2007). In 1996 HP conducted 
its first field application of PM requesting that 26 
“involved executives” forecast the future demand for a 
family of products (Chen and Ho, 2007). Despite the 
crowd not being as large or has perhaps diverse as 
Surowiecki may have wished, the Prediction Market 
error was more accurate than the official forecast error 
for six of the eight comparable events (Chen & Ho, 
2007). In the example above, HP’s incentive to use 
the aggregating power of PM was to test the accuracy 
of their usual forecasts developed by one ‘expert’ 
manager. In a similar market to that of HP, 
academics Ilan Silber and Aviad Israeli attempted to 
find a mechanism in which “a relatively small group 
of novice participants could achieve the same results 
as experts that generate pricing decisions (within the 
airline industry) by engaging in a costly and 
intelligent process of analyzing quantitative and 
qualitative data” (Israeli and Silber, 2012). 
Conducting their study based on the airline El Al, the 
academics found that through the use of a simple 
Prediction Market, consisting of only 51 participants, 
they could produce a pricing structure that was only 
0.4% or $3.50 different from the pricing set by the 
airline (Israeli and Silber, 2012). 
The above examples, represent the use of PM in 
testing a firm’s accuracy of current methods and the 
results question whether expensive decision 
techniques are really necessary. In addition to utilising 
PM to review cost cutting potential, some firms have 
used PM to assist decisions over what and when 
products should be brought to market, as well as them 
being employed to help combat a leading factor in bad 
decision-making - the isolation of executives from the 
views and insights of the company’s workforce 
(Strumpf, 2009). Over the past decade, General Electric 
(GE), one of the world’s most powerful organizations, 
held their own internal “Ideas Markets” (La Comb et al, 
2009). This market is a Prediction Market but it does 
not seek to reaffirm or test a decision mechanism but 
instead allows the market to actually define the decision 
that is to be taken. Based on the concept of Virtual 
Concept Testing (VCT) (Dahan and Srinivasan, 2000), 
participants ‘purchase’ their ‘securities’ by means of 
which products or ideas they most highly favor. Once a 
predetermined time period has elapsed, the market 
operators close down the market and have the opinions 
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of the crowd aggregated within the trading price of each 
of the ‘securities’ (Chan et al, 2002). The idea is that the 
top rated project ideas receive funding and at the same 
time boost the morale of the idea’s creator. GE used 
such a market in 2006 to elicit and rank-order 
technology and product ideas from across the sub-
businesses. They, like a number of leading academics, 
feel that such markets offer more promise than more 
traditional methods such as surveys, suggestion boxes 
and brainstorming sessions (see: Chan et al 2002; 
LaComb Barnett and Pan 2007; Strumpf 2009) in 
addition to the fact that market participants can 
experience the “fun of competitive play” (La Comb et 
al, 2009) rather than “dreaded meetings” (Strumpf, 
2009), another factor in allowing the “quiet geniuses” to 
emerge (Lavoie, 2009). As in any PM, the orchestrators 
of such markets are faced with the same issues as those 
carried out in financial and research markets; questions 
such as: Should incentives be provided? Can the market 
be manipulated and what effect can this have? To whom 
should the market be open? Should the market use real- 
or virtual-money? These questions are ones which this 
paper will attempt to answer in the forthcoming section. 
Issues Facing the Corporate Application of 
Prediction Markets 
 
When a Prediction Market is due to be implemented 
within a business, the market makers are faced with 
several unique challenges. Whatever the reason for the 
market to be administered, there are various stages 
leading up to and during the duration of the market 
where important decisions must be made. 
Contracts & Questions 
In the phase leading up to the market opening, 
appropriate questions must be formulated ensuring, 
that any questions that may require the crowd to have 
knowledge of quarantined information, are not present 
within the market (Strumpf, 2009). Contracts must also 
be carefully selected. Although heavily dependent 
upon the type of information sought from the market, 
the exclusivity of information surrounding that 
particular topic also plays a huge role. Caitlin Hall 
states that the more specific the topic, the smaller the 
number of traders who will hold relevant information 
thus creating a less liquid market which, in turn, is 
likely to decrease accuracy (Hall, 2010;43). This, 
therefore, leaves market-makers the challenge of 
balancing causal specificity and trade volumes (Hall, 
2010). 
Participants, Law and the Question of Real 
or Virtual Money 
In order for the wisdom of a crowd to be gathered, 
market participants must first be selected ensuring, 
where possible, they are independent and diverse. 
Take the example mentioned earlier in this paper of 
Galton’s Ox. The nature of Galton’s experiment 
required very little or no pre-requisite knowledge in 
order to reasonably attempt to answer the question 
posed. Galton’s crowd was therefore simply anybody 
present that day who was willing to wager sixpence. 
Craven, on the other hand, when looking to tap group 
wisdom in order to try and relocate a sunken and lost 
submarine, did not let just anybody participate within 
his market (see Drew and Sontag, 1998;146-150; 
Surowiecki, 2004; XX) . Instead he chose a wide 
range of knowledgeable individuals with expertise in 
mathematics, submarines and vessel salvaging. This 
more specific pool of individuals maintained the 
criteria of being diverse and independent, yet the 
knowledge possessed was related to a specific skill 
unlike that of the participants in Galton’s study. 
Despite both using the same principal, and obtaining a 
high level of accuracy, had the selection of 
participants not been of the correct nature, accuracy 
would have been compromised. In addition to selecting 
the participants within the market, a market maker must 
decide on how these participants will become involved 
in the market. In some circumstances, real-money 
trading may not be permitted by law due to insider 
trading rules. On the occasions where this is not the 
case the decision must be taken whether real-money is 
to be used or alternatively how much play-currency will 
be issued to participants. 
Incentive 
As has been previously alluded to, the role of 
incentive must be reviewed. If conducting an open 
study, participation can be increased through better 
prizes, monetary incentives and no entry fee, yet 
quality of estimate may then decrease (Ottaviani, 
2009). Hanson and Oprea believe however that there 
is no reason to be concerned with limiting noise 
traders; “by inducing more traders to become better 
informed, an increase in noise trading indirectly 
improves the accuracy of market prices” (Hanson 
and Oprea, 2004). Hall (2010) meanwhile suggests 
linking monetary rewards with trading profits or 
doubly rewarding the provision of good information. 
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During the Market 
Manipulation and Bias 
A potential limitation of conducting internal corporate 
PM is the possibility of the market being manipulated. 
Participants who trade on their own idea in an ideas 
market or on an outcome that they feel would be 
indirectly beneficial to them would be expected to 
distort the accuracy of the market in reflecting the real 
view of the crowd (Ottaviani, 2009). Although 
manipulation may be more attractive where rewards for 
doing so are greater, such as in a financial market, it is 
not only money that may entice market participants to 
become manipulators; kudos and status could also be 
driving factors (Hall, 2010). 
PM may also be more susceptible to manipulators for 
two reasons. Firstly, due to the fact that PM are 
relatively ‘thin’, prices are more easily moved by the 
nature of high‐volume transactions (Hall, 2010) and 
due to the fact that the ability to move the market 
price of an asset is a key condition of profitable 
manipulation, PM are ideal targets (Camerer, 1998). 
Secondly, it may be conceived by other traders in a 
market that so called ‘opinion traders’, traders who 
trade on private information, are greater in number 
than reality. Should this prevail, traders may follow 
the trade direction of the conceived opinion traders 
and indeed assist a manipulator in manipulating the 
market to his advantage (Hall, 2010). 
Despite the concern regarding the negative effect on 
accuracy, manipulation within a market could have the 
reverse effect. Hanson and Oprea in their aptly named 
paper, ‘Manipulators Increase Information market 
Accuracy’ (2004), state in their research that 
manipulators may not decrease accuracy within 
markets after all. Making examples of manipulative 
situations such as DARPA’s PAM they explain that a 
manipulator within a “standard market microstructure 
model of thin information markets, with rational or 
irrational traders who can obtain information with 
effort, a manipulator bias that is within the range of 
biases that traders suspect might exist, will on average 
improve price accuracy” (Hanson and Oprea, 2004). 
Although PM provide a powerful incentive for 
truthful disclosure of information, biases, as revealed 
in section 3:2, may exist within markets and 
collected data sets. Biases such as Optimism Bias 
and Favourite Longshot Bias (see Manski 2004; 
Vaughn Williams 2005) are often present, not 
through conscious thought of individuals, but 
idiosyncrasies of the human mind affecting judgment 
and rationale (Wolfers, 2009).  
Some academic research has focused on potential 
flaws with the prediction market concept. In 
particular, Dr. Charles F. Manski of Northwestern 
University published "Interpreting the Predictions of 
Prediction Markets", which attempts to show 
mathematically that under a wide range of 
assumptions the "predictions" of such markets do not 
closely correspond to the actual probability beliefs of 
the market participants unless the market probability 
is near either 0 or 1. Manski suggests that directly 
asking a group of participants to estimate 
probabilities may lead to better results. However, 
Steven Gjerstad (Purdue) in his paper "Risk 
Aversion, Beliefs, and Prediction Market 
Equilibrium, has shown that prediction market prices 
are very close to the mean belief of market 
participants if the agents are risk averse and the 
distribution of beliefs is spread out (as with a normal 
distribution, for example). Justin Wolfers (Wharton) 
and Eric Zitzewitz (Dartmouth) have obtained similar 
results, and also include some analysis of prediction 
market data, in their paper "Interpreting Prediction 
Market Prices as Probabilities. 
 In practice, the prices of binary prediction markets 
have proven to be closely related to actual 
frequencies of events in the real world. Douglas 
Hubbard has also conducted a sample of over 400 
retired claims which showed that the probability of 
an event is close to its market price but, more 
importantly, significantly closer than the average 
single subjective estimate. However, he also shows 
that this benefit is partly offset if individuals first 
undergo calibrated probability assessment training so 
that they are good at assessing odds subjectively. The 
key benefit of the market, Hubbard claims, is that it 
mostly adjusts for uncalibrated estimates and, at the 
same time, incentivizes market participants to seek 
further information. A series of laboratory 
experiments to compare the accuracy of prediction 
markets, traditional meetings, the Delphi method, 
and the nominal group technique on a quantitative 
judgment task, found only small differences between 
these four methods (Rajakovich & Vladimirov, 2009; 
Paton, et al, 2009). Delphi was most accurate, 
followed by NGT and prediction markets. Meetings 
performed worst. The study also looked at 
participants' perceptions of the methods. Prediction 
markets were rated least favourable: prediction 
market participants were least satisfied with the 
group process and perceived their method as the most 
difficult (Grainger, et al, 1994; Cook, et al, 2010)  
A common belief among economists and the 
financial community in general is that prediction 
markets based on play money cannot possibly 
generate credible predictions. However, the data 
collected so far disagrees. Analyzed data from the 
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Hollywood Stock Exchange and the Foresight 
Exchange concluded that market prices predicted 
actual outcomes and/or outcome frequencies in the 
real world. Comparing an entire season's worth of 
NFL predictions from NewsFutures play-money 
exchange to those of Tradesports, an equivalent real-
money exchange based in Ireland, both exchanges 
performed equally well. In this case, using real 
money did not lead to better predictions (Kittur, et al,  
2008; Schweigler et al, 2009). Hollywood Stock 
Exchange creator Max Keiser suggests that not only 
are these markets no more predictive than their 
established counterparts such as the New York Stock 
Exchange and the London Stock Exchange, but that 
reducing the unpredictability of markets would mean 
reducing risk and, therefore, reducing the amount of 
speculative capital needed to keep markets open and 
liquid (Servan‐Schreiber et al, 2004). 
Conclusions and Future Direction 
 
This review has examined the evolution and 
corporate application of prediction markets. It is 
evident that the role of prediction market in decision 
making hold a greater prospect (Lorenz, et al, 2011). 
This is because the results from corporate 
organizations that have used the mechanism are very 
promising despite occasional challenges associated 
with defining a creative market. It is also noted that 
the effectiveness of prediction market in corporate 
decision making especially is also largely dependent 
on the prevalence of certain conditions (Shaw, 
Subramaniam, Tan, & Welge, 2001). Ever since the 
work of Galton, mathematical models have been used 
to examine the accuracy of simulations of crowd 
wisdom with psychologists, econometricians and 
financiers alike attempting to ascertain the conditions 
under which crowd wisdom is capable of achieving 
reliable outcomes (Frederick et al, 2011; Kugler, et 
al, 2012). From work undertaken by Hogarth (1978) 
and Makridakis and Winkler (1983) it was inferred 
that If a crowd’s judgment contains ‘signal-plus-
noise’, averaging judgments will cancel out noise 
thus revealing a signal (Arteche 2004; Caporale & 
Gil-Alana 2010; Graefe et al, 2011). As Surowiecki 
(2004) states, the real key to ‘tapping’ crowd wisdom 
is not so much perfecting the method used but is 
satisfying three conditions that groups require in 
order to be “smart”. These conditions, Diversity, 
Independence, Decentralisation and Incentive are 
outlined below. 
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